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Amsterdam and London as financial centers
in the eighteenth century1
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In the seventeenth century, Amsterdam and London developed distinctive innovations in finance
through both banks and markets that facilitated the growth of trade in each city. In the eighteenth
century, a symbiotic relation developed that led to bank-oriented finance in Amsterdam cooperating
with market-oriented finance in London. The relationship that emerged allowed each to rise to unpre-
cedented dominance in Europe, while the respective financial innovations in each city provided the
means for the continued expansion of European trade, both within Europe and with the rest of the
world. The increasing strains of war finance for the competing European powers over the course of
the eighteenth century stimulated fresh financial innovations in each city that initially reinforced the
symbiosis of the two centers. The external shocks arising from revolutionary movements in America
and France, however, interrupted the relationship long enough to leave London as the supreme financial
center.
Keywords: Bank of Amsterdam, Bank of England, financial innovations, capital markets, banking,
monetary regimes
JEL classification: N20, N23
The continued dominance of London as the preeminent global financial center at the
start of the twenty-first century remains a puzzle. London’s position of dominance has
continued despite Britain’s abstaining from the common currency of the European
Union and despite the rise of first New York, then Tokyo, and now Shanghai as
major financial centers in much larger economies. Why is it that Frankfurt, the
banking and financial center of the largest economy in Europe and now the seat
of the European Central Bank, cannot displace London, or for that matter
New York? The same question arises for Paris, which combines both central govern-
ment functions and an entrenched cosmopolitan elite from government, business and
culture. The puzzle of persistent ‘capitals of capital’, as Youssef Cassis () has
1 An early version of this paper was presented at the European Association of Banking History annual
meeting in Frankfurt in . In response to extensive and constructive comments by the editor
and two referees (we assume one English and one Dutch), extensive revisions and improvements
have been made as well as developing an entirely new theme. Omissions and errors remain, of
course, our responsibility.
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expressed it, has stimulated a great deal of scholarly work by business historians to
discern what economic, political, legal and social forces create such continuity in
the existence of financial centers.
Historians typically invoke arguments about network externalities that, once
created by a diversity of trade and manufacturing opportunities, can sustain a cosmo-
politan financial center long after trade or manufacturing activities have moved else-
where.2 Economists elaborate on economies of scope and scale that caught the
attention of Charles Kindleberger at the breakup of the Bretton Woods system in
the s, with consequences that persist to the present.3 All of these analyses consider
a center as a complete financial system, comprising a variety of institutions ranging from
a central bank to credit cooperatives combined with a variety of markets ranging from
government debt to exotic derivatives. The precise composition of institutions and
markets in each center’s financial system usually varies with predictable consequences
for the extent and depth of its corresponding network of financial ties, which in turn
determine the dominance and persistence of the center.
Until the introduction of the common currency in the European Union in , it
was easy to distinguish some financial centers as ‘market-oriented’ (London and
New York) from others as ‘bank-oriented’ (Frankfurt, Paris and Tokyo). Only in
the twenty-first century have we seen a rapid convergence of the two distinctive
systems of finance under the competitive pressures of global finance, culminating, it
appears at present, with the global financial crisis that began in . Yet finance text-
books remind us that the two methods of bringing the potential supply of loanable
funds into contact with the underlying demand to exploit investment opportunities
in an economy are ultimately complementary. Jeremy Atack () points out that
bank andmarket systems perform the same five basic functions of () providing liquid-
ity, () resolving denomination mismatches, () reducing credit risk, () mediating
maturity differences, and () bearing interest rate and exchange rate risk, but that insti-
tutions and markets do it in different ways. The distinction may also be seen as the
difference between personal exchange, based on confidential information between
the banker and the client, whether the client is a depositor or a borrower, and imper-
sonal exchange, based on publicly available information accessible to all participants.
Two implications follow from these distinctive methods of organizing financial
intermediation: one is that innovations in either institutions or markets create disrup-
tions in the intermediation carried on by the other branch of the system – crises are
frequently the result. Another implication, however, is that when both components
2 Youssef Cassis and his many collaborators (, , , , ) are the archetype of this
approach, drawing upon their extensive work on bankers and financiers in Britain, France, and the
rest of continental Europe over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Spufford () takes the
network based on trade patterns theme back to medieval Europe, beginning with Venice and Bruges.
3 Kindleberger () drew upon his extensive reading in the financial history of western Europe.
Roberts (, ) and Diederiks and Reeder () have elaborated the historical vignettes as
well as the underlying economic analysis.
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are operating effectively to perform the five financial functions listed above, the per-
formance of each is enhanced and the economy prospers as a result. The monitoring
capabilities of the banks over the liquidity needs of their clients are increased by their
observation of the fluctuations in the stock market, as well as the prices of the secu-
rities issued by their business borrowers. The price discovery function of capital
markets, on the other hand, is improved by the operations of intermediaries who
use superior information to buy or sell any given security.
In The Rise of Financial Capitalism (), Larry Neal argued that financial inno-
vations in western Europe, driven by the incredible expansion of trade-oriented
port cities of the Atlantic in the sixteenth century, ‘were adopted only fitfully by
other European states over the course of the seventeenth century. In the case of
Holland and England, the innovations were implemented in improved, more efficient
form, because the process of transplantation eliminated the legal restrictions and
encumbrances that had been imposed in the country of origin’ (p. ). The basic
idea was that innovations can become more productive when they are transplanted,
an idea that goes back at least to Thorstein Veblen in his Theory of the Leisure Class.
In the s it had general credence among economic historians who accepted the
Gerschenkron hypothesis of the ‘advantages of backwardness’ (Gerschenkron ).
Following the lead of Herman van derWee ( and ) and P. G. M. Dickson
(), Neal went on to argue that the British capital market in government debt
created after the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of  was more efficient in many ways
than the original innovation in the Netherlands based on the Verenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie (VOC). The British market was based on the government’s
long-term debt owed to a government-chartered and supported joint-stock
company such as the Bank of England or the New East India Company, while the
Dutch market was based on a variety of debt instruments issued by the individual
cities and provinces of the Netherlands. True, the capital of the VOC was privately
invested, as Gelderblom and Jonker () emphasize. Over the course of the eight-
eenth century, however, even Dutch investors recognized the financial advantages for
them that were created by the rapidly growing amount of British government debt
available to them. Although crises interrupted this process in the years -,
what makes the experience of the eighteenth century so interesting is that both the
British and Dutch economies eventually recovered and prospered through the
remainder of the eighteenth century until general warfare broke out again in .
Neal argued that the Dutch enthusiasm for the British innovations, readily recogniz-
able to them as imitating and improving on their own financial system, helped lay the
basis for eventual industrialization in Britain, essentially by allowing Britain to win its
strategic wars with France thereafter. He paid little attention to the consequences for
the Dutch economy, save that the English East India Company increasingly prospered
relative to the Dutch Verenigde Oost-indische Compagnie (Neal , ch. ).
Since publication of The Rise of Financial Capitalism in , an entire generation
of new scholars have dealt with many aspects of Neal’s thesis. Their work and
ours requires modifications, sometimes minor, sometimes major, of the several
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components of that argument. Given the current concerns over how to reestablish
complementarity between the distinctly different functions of financial institutions
and markets, we focus first on how the bank-oriented system of the Netherlands
and the market-oriented system of Britain arose in the seventeenth century prior to
the Glorious Revolution of . Then we describe how, with some travail and
further experimentation, the two countries established a symbiotic relationship that
finally fell into place from roughly  to , a symbiosis that proved highly ben-
eficial for both financial systems. Finally, we take up the sundering of the symbiosis,
which took place first gradually and then abruptly, during the wars that finally ended
in . By this time London had no problemmaintaining its preeminence as a finan-
cial center, while Amsterdam was then forced to play subsidiary and supporting roles,
first to the market-oriented systems of Britain and America and then to the bank-
oriented systems of the European continent.4
I
At the close of the sixteenth century, both Britain and the Netherlands managed to
break away from political dominance by the Spanish empire under Philip II, Britain
with the defeat of the Spanish Armada in  and the Netherlands with its Eighty
Years War with Spain beginning in . Thereafter each country managed to
pursue independent paths toward modernity, both political and economic, before
reaching political accommodation with each other in . We focus here on the dis-
tinctly different innovations in finance undertaken by each country, innovations that
laid the basis for the later emphasis on market forms of finance in Britain and bank
intermediation in the Netherlands. Herman van der Wee () described in detail
how novel financial instruments evolved in Antwerp to finance the growing
volume of international trade in that city over the course of the sixteenth century.
Later, he argued that ‘[t]he revitalization of financial methods in the th and th
centuries followed two distinct paths of development: one inspired by Italian pro-
cedures and passing fromGeneva-Lyons-Genoa to Amsterdam; the other, more inde-
pendent of Italian influence and more innovative, went from Antwerp to London’
(van der Wee , p. ).
According to van der Wee, Antwerp developed the foreign bill of exchange as a
negotiable instrument through the process of serial endorsement, which provided
increasing security for final payment of the bill to each successive endorser. All pre-
vious endorsers were equally responsible with the initial accepter of the bill for
making payment. Developed first for standard obligation notes, and then extended
4 In the period immediately preceding the  crisis, the Netherlands was once again portrayed by the
International Monetary Fund as one of the leading countries in the new age of financial intermedia-
tion, combining increased market securitizations with a greater variety of financial institutions along
with the United States and the United Kingdom (IMF, World Economic Outlook, September ,
ch. .).
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to foreign bills of exchange, serial assignability contrasted with final payment taking
place with each successive transfer of the note. Van der Wee expanded on the later
significance of these innovations in Antwerp by noting that private circulation of
negotiable bills of exchange was adopted in the seventeenth century by the British
and further developed there. In contrast, clearing payments through a public bank
became the basis for the Dutch payments system through the seventeenth century,
setting the stage for the continued divergence of the two financial systems.
Antwerp’s innovations were driven essentially by the need to make use of private
credit instruments to facilitate payments in its prospering market when silver from the
mines in southern Germany was diverted to Lisbon by the Spanish rulers in order to
finance the Portuguese trade with the East Indies. The Dutch revolt soon followed
and eventually succeeded first in removing Spanish forces from what became the
United Provinces of the Netherlands. By closing off the Scheldt River, the Dutch
destroyed the international trade of Antwerp, which remained under Spanish
control. The Amsterdam city fathers welcomed the flight capital of the Antwerp mer-
chants, but they insisted on maintaining it within the confines of the Bank of
Amsterdam, established in  and explicitly modeled on the Rialto Bank of
Venice. In this way, the city fathers maintained their political authority while the
Antwerp merchants sustained their overseas trading opportunities, but now directed
them from Amsterdam (Lesger ). By forcing the deposit of the specie, silver and
gold earned from the expansion of overseas trade into accounts at the Bank of
Amsterdam, the city authorities circumvented the problem of currency shortage
that had driven the Antwerp merchants to make the financial innovations described
by van der Wee.
By contrast, the joint kingdoms of England & Wales and Scotland under James I
and VI had no public bank, or wealthy merchants, or sophisticated bankers, much
less a stock of metallic moneys stored in a central secure place. As Kerridge (,
p. ) phrased it, ‘Banking was still without “bankers” so-called.’ They were rather
merchants or factors making payments from one inland trading city to another as
part of their trading activities. Foreign bills of exchange in Britain were negotiated
by ‘remitters’, who were largely Italians and Netherlanders (ibid.). By mid-seven-
teenth century, then, the same process that van der Wee described for Antwerp in
the previous century was occurring in England – the bills obligatory issued person
to person for extended periods of time were becoming transferable by endorsement
and virtually indistinguishable from inland bills of exchange. Persons wanting to
receive immediate cash would go to the nearest commodity market and try to sell
inland bills of exchange on London; sellers flush with cash, especially cattle drovers
after disposing of their herds for cash, would want to buy inland bills of exchange,
rather than carry back large sums of money. The bill on London became the standard
means of payment, and the bill market in London then became the clearing process
for the settlement of accounts in lieu of a public bank (Kerridge ).
In Holland, by sharp contrast to these developments in Britain, the Bank of
Amsterdam provided efficient clearing of payments among wholesale merchants
AMSTERDAM AND LONDON AS F INANCIAL CENTERS 
and their suppliers. A group of kassiers developed to intermediate between shop-
keepers dealing with small amounts of cash and wholesalers dealing with large trans-
actions through the Bank of Amsterdam (de Vries and van der Woude ; Quinn
and Roberds ). Rather than dealing with each other in a network web as became
the casewith goldsmith-bankers in London, each kassier dealt with his set of customers
and the Bank of Amsterdam. The stable, but never actually minted, bank guilder
became the standard unit of account for foreign and wholesale transactions. The
central role of the Wisselbank in the payments system of Amsterdam was assured
by the city authorities who outlawed all existing moneychangers and cashiers from
competing with the Wisselbank in providing payment facilities. Further, they also
outlawed the kassiers’ notes that had been issued as receipts for coins placed with
them for safekeeping. These notes had been used as means of payment among mer-
chants, a practice that eventually flourished among goldsmith-bankers in London.
The kassiers were allowed to resume business in , but only as licensed officials
and under the restriction that they could not hold specie for longer than  hours
before depositing it in their account at the Bank of Amsterdam (Dehing and ’t
Hart, pp. -).
While London had no centralized banking system or a broadly based and well-
functioning market for long-term government debt before , over the course
of the seventeenth century it did develop a centralized market in company shares.
The creation of the English East India Company (EIC) in  led to a secondary
market in shares by the middle of the century. Unlike the Dutch competitor that
soon followed, shareholders in the EIC ran the company and were elected annually.
Indeed, this was to be the standard form in all subsequent chartered joint-stock com-
panies in England and Scotland, demonstrating that company promoters in Britain
had to appeal to a broad market pool of potential investors to have any success. As
a result, British companies had more flexibility in decisions regarding increases in
equity through new equity offerings and with stock splits. Relative to Amsterdam
and Holland, London and England saw the chartering of a wide range of companies
especially during the second half of the seventeenth century. Scott () in his
history of English, Scottish and Irish joint-stock companies lists over fifty separate
companies. Some of these were small and some did not last very long. But what is
clear is that prior to , most sectors and a wide range of individuals had some
experience with the equity market and the secondary market in shares. As a result,
London had developed centralized brokers who dealt in company shares and stood
ready to buy and sell (Carlos, Key and Dupree ). It was this market that would
grow exponentially in the last decade of the seventeenth century (Murphy ).
The importance of maintaining political control by the local city elites in the
Netherlands while enjoying the fruits of capital imports also characterized the struc-
ture of the United East India Company (VOC, for Verenigde Oost-Indische
Compagnie), the Dutch competitor to the EIC founded in . The political jea-
lousies of the separate provinces and the individual trading cities toward the eminence
of Amsterdam meant that the VOC shares were divided up among the six
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participating cities. Amsterdam, by far the dominant city, had to agree to keep its share
of the company’s capital stock just below half. The remaining shares that were split up
among the other six cities never provided a large enough body of tradable securities to
allow an active stock market to emerge outside Amsterdam. Even there, only the
capital stock of the Amsterdam chamber of the VOC provided enough volume of
trading activity to sustain the livelihood of a small group of stockbrokers (de Korte
).5 Direction of the company was maintained by a board of directors, the
Heeren XVII, appointed by each city in proportion to their share of the total capital
stock. To avoid any political conflict, much less a shareholders’ revolt, the capital
stock remained fixed from  until .
The pressing demands for war finance dominated the political powers in both
Britain (Civil War and interregnum -) and the Netherlands (Thirty Years
War, -), and led to financial innovations in government finance for both
countries in the seventeenth century. The differences in British and Dutch exper-
iments in raising new sources of funds had consequences that made their respective
paths to modernity diverge even farther. How each country tried to resolve the
‘big problem of small change’ with their domestic coinage provides an instructive
example of path dependence in the development of each country’s financial system.
In the Netherlands, the desperate finances of the individual provinces by the
middle of the Eighty Years War (-) between the Netherlands and Spain
had led each of the fourteen mints in the Netherlands (eight provincial and six
municipal) to follow its own policy in the timing and extent of successive debase-
ments. Mints in the adjacent areas of the Spanish Netherlands and Westphalia also
produced their own variants. Foreign coins were introduced in profusion as well by
merchants from abroad. By , it has been estimated that moneychangers in
Amsterdam had to keep track of nearly a thousand different gold and silver coins.6
As would be the pattern throughout the Netherlands until , the province of
Holland took the initiative in clarifying the situation. In , the city of
Amsterdam decreed that its unit of account, the guilder, should contain slightly less
than  grams of pure silver – a standard that remained unchanged until the s.
This measure also set the relative value of the current coin to the guilder of
account used to value deposits in the Amsterdamse Wisselbank.7 In , the
States General of the Netherlands followed the Amsterdam example, completing
the monetary unification of the country.
Britain, by contrast, was unable to initiate comparable reforms in its coinage. This
was partly due to separate coinages in England, Ireland and Scotland and the political
difficulties of making reform in one kingdom without a corresponding reform in the
others, a problem that plagued the British currencies even after the recoinage of .
5 The PhD dissertation underway by Lodewijk Petram at the University of Amsterdam () argues
that a dedicated group of market makers for VOC stock only appeared in the s.
6 Dehing and ’t Hart (), p. , cite Enno van Gelder (/, p. ).
7 A guilder still based on the silver guilder established by Charles V in .
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The ‘big problem of small change’ (Redish ; Sargent and Velde ) for Great
Britain as a whole persisted until , when the government finally minted token
coins with fixed rates of convertibility to their large denomination coins and bank
notes – the ‘standard formula’ according to Sargent and Velde. Only then were the
thousands of token coins issued privately and locally over the previous two centuries
displaced, as well as the country bank notes that had exploded during the suspension
of convertibility of Bank of England notes from  to . The inability of the
successive governments in Britain to implement the ‘standard formula’ already in
place in the Netherlands and most of continental Europe with respect to coinage
meant that the differences between the two financial systems with respect to banks
and capital markets were sustained as well.
The contrasting case of the goldsmith-bankers in London with kassiers in
Amsterdam highlights why we can characterize even the seventeenth-century finan-
cial systems as bank-centered in Amsterdam and market-centered in London
(Richards ; Quinn ), even while accepting the overall superiority of the
Dutch financial system with both banks and markets operating effectively. In
London, the goldsmith-bankers held their own reserves in gold or silver rather
than turn all specie over to a central repository such as the Tower of London or
the mint, where it could be seized by the central authority. By issuing notes that
gave the holder the right to withdraw the specie upon due notice, the goldsmith-
bankers created an increase in the means of payment. Importantly for the security
of the system as a whole, they held each other’s notes in sufficient quantity to have
a claim upon the reserves of other goldsmiths in case of a sudden demand for redeem-
ing their own notes. These also served as a ‘poison pill’ against a threat by a competing
bank. In this way, the goldsmiths created a mutually reinforcing payments network
that laid the basis for further market interactions in the future when markets for
new securities appeared (Quinn ). Maintaining the credibility of the network
requiredmultiple monitors both among the goldsmiths in London andwith their cor-
respondents overseas (Neal andQuinn ). The dispersal of metallic reserves among
multiple agents across the British network contrasted with the concentrated reserves
maintained in the public deposit bank in Amsterdam – and this contrast drove finan-
cial innovation along separate paths in the two cities.
During the prolonged struggle for independence from Spain, the individual pro-
vinces and cities in the Netherlands created public debt instruments in prolific quan-
tities. Each of themwas backed by specific taxes dedicated to a specific debt issued by a
particular province or, most typically, the general taxes of an individual municipality
(Fritschy ). Only when the threat of defeat at the hands of the Spanish seemed
imminent in  was the province of Holland able to control the excise taxes col-
lected province-wide on beer and wine by the six major towns, laying the basis for
the Dutch financial revolution according to Fritschy (). As the struggle for inde-
pendence from Spain lengthened into the eventual Eighty Years War, culminating
only with the Treaty of Westphalia in , the public finances of Holland gradually
tended more toward reliance on short-term bonds, obligations, serviced by tax-
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receivers located in the towns. When needed, forced loans were raised on the basis of
updated censuses of wealth in the province. Although there were three Anglo-Dutch
wars (-, - and -) in the period between  and , Holland’s
public finances were sufficiently robust that only the last required forced loans, and
these were in the form of obligations. These short-term bonds, while requiring
more frequent turnover than annuities by the authorities, were issued and serviced
by local tax receivers, and could be transferred by endorsement, or in some cases
were issued to bearer. As a result, the secondary market for bonds issued by the pro-
vince of Holland cannot be measured directly, but it was clearly active enough to
make obligations the dominant form of public debt issued during the eighteenth
century (Gelderblom and Jonker b, ).
The emphasis on the public debt issued by the self-governing cities in the Low
Countries did constitute an early financial revolution (Tracey ), especially
when adopted by the province of Holland (Fritschy ; t’Hart , , ;
Gelderblom and Jonker b, ). But the municipal and then provincial taxes
that backed the public debts highlights the striking fact that the Netherlands, due
to the fragmented character of its political structure, never issued a truly national
debt backed by a national taxing authority until the Napoleonic period. Despite
the constant pressures placed on Dutch financial resources by the repeated assaults
of the French or English, the national response was to seek neutrality, especially
after the enormous expenditures required for the War of the Spanish Succession,
and to resist the importunate demands of warlike stadholders such as William III.
Consequently, the Netherlands did not imitate the financial revolution that devel-
oped in England over the course of the eighteenth century, even though its constitu-
ent cities and provinces had developed the basic elements of funded, fungible and
assignable debt backed by perpetual taxing authorities – the essential elements of
the financial revolution of England. Moreover, as shown below, the Dutch did not
need a national debt for creating a deep secondary market for securities while they
had full access to the English market.
I I
Neal (), following Dickson (), attributed much of the success of the financial
reforms initiated under William III to his Dutch financial advisors, while acknowled-
ging the unique way some of the Dutch techniques were imported and improved.
The importance of previous fiscal reforms under Charles II (Chandaman ) and
even earlier under Cromwell (Ashley , repr. ) have been extolled by
Michael Braddick (). Despite the appropriation of church lands by Henry
VIII, the re-allocation of them to local gentry and nobles to support the Tudor
dynasty meant that the English monarchy had very limited resources from which
to maintain a prestigious court, much less to wage-sustained warfare overseas. To
increase their revenue meant increasing taxes and the Civil War permanently put
control of taxes in the hands of Parliament. Under Cromwell the excise was
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introduced on the Spanish and Dutch models, but under centralized authority, unlike
the provincial models of Spain and the Netherlands. Further, even the land tax was
reassessed by Parliament and then collected on a monthly basis. Both innovations
went far beyond anything attempted in the Netherlands then or even later.
Centralized collection of the excise under Cromwell was followed by central
control (and reallocation) of the customs revenues as well under Charles II. Finally,
the rationalization of Treasury accounts initiated by George Downing meant that
at least the Exchequer could monitor the flow of receipts and expenditures on a
regular basis. Implicit in the increased pace of collection of tax revenues and improved
monitoring of their flow was the possibility for securitization of anticipated future
taxes, well before the regime change in  (Roseveare ; Coffman ).
Marjolein t’Hart () took issue with Dickson over whether it was ‘the Devil or
the Dutch’ that were primarily responsible for the implanting the key elements of the
Dutch city and provincial models of public finance in Britain after . She con-
cluded that it was more the likely the Devil, given both the history of prior tax inno-
vations and fiscal reforms in England and the ambivalence of William himself over
becoming controlled by mercantile interests whether in London or Holland.
While the idea of a funded long-term debt was self-consciously based on the successes
of the Dutch cities and provinces, the importance of annuities was declining for
Holland after the mid-seventeenth century. Even for Britain, short-term debt was
far more important as a source of finance for William’s wars (Sussman and Yafeh
). The importance of the prior rationalization of the Treasury as well was
made clear in the work by Roseveare (), who also emphasized the importance
of centralized collection of tax revenues and management of them at the Treasury
before the establishment of the Bank of England. The pressures of war finance
during the War of the Spanish Succession finally led the province of Holland to
initiate a state lottery loan, a direct imitation of the many lottery loans created
earlier in England, a striking example of financial innovation in the opposite
direction.8
I I I
The South Sea bubble initially drew many new Dutch investors into the London
market as the price of South Sea stock was rising. When it collapsed, many of the
Dutch were caught holding claims on the new subscriptions and eventually in the
new perpetual annuities that were distributed in  to the existing stockholders
of the company. So extensive was the Dutch participation in the London stock
market of , the Dutch scholar Groeneveld () proclaimed that year saw the
8 Even with well-established techniques such as state lotteries in the seventeenth century, there could be
difficulties in transplanting them. A letter by John Drummond to Robert Harley from Amsterdam
informed him that the initial sales of lottery tickets in Holland were dismal until his countryman,
John Law, initiated an insurance scheme for ticket holders.
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creation of a cosmopolitan Dutch investor class. Charles Wilson’s pathbreaking work
(Wilson ) documented extensively from Dutch notarial archives the interlacing
of Dutch mercantile capital with British merchants, often intermediated through
exchanges of English government stock (Wilson ). Alice Carter () continued
dredging out details of the extent of Dutch holdings in English government stock
thereafter. David Ormrod () has explored the changing forms of mercantile
organization that emerged in the eighteenth century in response to the increased
size and scope of Anglo-Dutch trade, while James C. Riley () has extolled the
role of Dutch merchant bankers in providing government finances to the rest of
Europe, especially the Hanseatic port cities and German principalities as well as
Tsarist Russia and absolutist France.
To appreciate the complementarity that we argue arose between the financial
systems of Amsterdam and London in the period from  to , we draw atten-
tion to the rising importance of stockjobbers in London and merchants bankers in
Amsterdam. Stockjobbers became symbolic of the new importance of the stock
market in London, especially for dealing in the large increases in government debt.
Goldsmith-bankers, while wealthy and profitable, were limited in the number of
partners they could have (six) and ultimately in the amount of capital stock at their
disposal. After the collapse of the South Sea bubble, and the failure of the gold-
smith-banks that were most active in stockjobbing, such as Mitford and Merttins,
private bankers stayed away from backing large-scale projects, while successful stock-
jobber-dealers such as Robert Westley (Bank of England stock) or Richard
Lockwood (York Buildings) became prominent figures in the City.
The major merchant bankers in Amsterdam also did very well indeed during the
stock market manias that swept through Paris and London in the years –, but
mainly by providing safe havens for flight capital from France rather than promoting
new joint-stock companies in the Netherlands. Based on their accounts in the Bank
of Amsterdam, Buist (, appendixes) shows how firms such as Andries Pels &
Sons, Clifford & Company, de Neufville and, by the middle of the eighteenth
century, the house of Hope became the icons of patrician capitalists. It is the interaction
between the leading stockjobbers in London and the leading merchant bankers in
Amsterdam that illuminates the complementarity of the two financial centers –
London, focused on developing the financial products most attractive for public inves-
tors, and Amsterdam, managing private portfolios in search of high, secure returns.
The creation of the Bank of England in  finally gave London a bank that could
act on a scale as large as that of the Bank of Amsterdam. Unlike the Bank of
Amsterdam, however, the Bank of England was a joint-stock company along the
lines of the East India Company, Royal African Company and Hudson’s Bay
Company to name a few of the already existing companies. It was created not by a
merchant guild or government. Subscriptions of capital came from a wide variety
of persons: goldsmith-bankers, a larger number of small merchants and artisans in
London, and a number of Dutch individuals, both naturalized and foreign. The gov-
ernance of the bank set out in its charter was the same as that of the existing joint-stock
AMSTERDAM AND LONDON AS F INANCIAL CENTERS 
companies. There was an elected, not appointed, court of directors, and each share-
holder with £ capital was entitled to vote for the Directors. The Bank of
England’s corporate structure, therefore, made it far more responsive to the economic
and financial demands of its customers and especially its shareholders than was the case
for the Bank of Amsterdam, which was always subject to governance by the city auth-
orities, or the VOC, which had to deal with six separate sets of city authorities that
made up the Heeren XVII.
As was the custom for the existing goldsmith-bankers in London, the Bank of
England could and did issue banknotes with a total redeemable value greater than
the stock of silver and gold on hand. This made it a fractional reserve bank, unlike
the Bank of Amsterdam.Moreover, it could discount bills of exchange in competition
with the services provided by existing merchant houses, lawyers, scriveners and gold-
smiths. Payments among account holders were facilitated by book transfer, as in the
case of the Bank of Amsterdam. In combination with the services already provided by
the Bank of Amsterdam, then, the Bank of England enabled multilateral clearing of
international payments among European merchants to occur thereafter (Sperling
). In many respects, the English centralized financial market and the pre-existing
secondary market in shares would give it an advantage over its Dutch counterparts in
the eighteenth century.
The new coinage created in  solved for the time being the difficulties of the
Bank, but in light of the continued export of silver and import of gold, the mint
ratio was set at :, making England effectively on a gold standard, while the
Netherlands was thereafter on a silver standard with a mint ratio of .:, although
both were legally on a bimetallic standard. The consequence of having both gold
points and silver points limiting the range within which exchange rates on bills of
exchange could fluctuate was to narrow further the possible fluctuations in the
course of the exchange rate on foreign bills of exchange between the two countries
(see Flandreau ; Quinn ). This unforeseen outcome of Isaac Newton’s direc-
tion of the re-minting process served not only to facilitate further the payments for the
growing trade between the twomercantile powers, but also to removemost exchange
risk in capital movements between them. The monetary basis for the financial sym-
biosis of the two countries was therefore in place from , when the English recoi-
nage was completed, to , when the Bank of England was forced to suspend
convertibility of its notes into gold or silver.
A further advantage of the corporate structure of the Bank of England, compared to
that of the VOC, was the concentration of its capital stock in one city, London, instead
of divided up in fixed proportions determined by political considerations among the
various port cities, as was the capital stock of the VOC. In the long run, this meant
that the Bank of England (chartered in ), the New East India Company (chartered
in ) and the South Sea Company (chartered in ), like all earlier English joint-
stock companies, were all fully capable of increasing their capital stock in order to
enlarge their activities when that met the interests of the stockholders. The VOC, by
contrast, never increased its capital stock throughout the eighteenth century, even as
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trade between Europe and Asia continued to grow. Finally, the transfer books and stock
ledgers of the Bank of England, modeled on those of the VOC, were kept available for
transfers on all business days for the Bank. Those of the VOC, by contrast, were usually
opened for transfers when dividends were to be paid out. Consequently, trade in Bank
of England shares (as in all joint-stock companies in London) could be daily for spot
transactions, while trade in VOC and West India Company (WIC) shares in
Amsterdam had to be on a forward, time contract basis. Eventually, especially after
the refinance of the South Sea Company’s shares in , much of the business of
Amsterdam’s stockjobbers revolved around the enormous capital stock of the English
companies, and the British government long-term debt.
The establishment of the South Sea Company in , which imitated the earlier
successes of the Bank of England and the New East India Company in refinancing
depreciated wartime government debt, createdmore opportunities for cross-holdings.
In , the Scottish financier John Law, then resident in Amsterdam, bought shares
in the South Sea Company through the agency of his friend and mentor, Lord Ilay,
using the services of Ilay’s goldsmith-banker in London, George Middleton.9 By the
end of , when more Dutch money came to London in pursuit of the speculative
gains to be had during the run-up in price of South Sea stock, Dutch holdings in Bank
of England stock amounted to nearly  percent of the new purchases of Bank stock
from  to , a period when the Bank’s stock increased by  percent (Carlos
and Neal , table ). Indeed, the success of the English system of joint-stock com-
panies led at least one Dutch man to emulate the model:
We have established a company to insure ships, for the perils at sea, war and piracy, which is
necessary for the trade and maritime trade, and which have been successfully established like-
wise in England, and have fully secured the insurance by gathering a large pool of capital: as
such the initiator of this company believes that it would be a good idea to establish such a
company, by collecting capital, in Rotterdam, as has been successfully done in England,
and proposes to subscribe under the following conditions:…10
Pledging of shares of widely held corporations such as the VOC as collateral for
private loans occurred almost immediately in the Netherlands at the beginning of
the seventeenth century (Gelderblom and Jonker ). We know that this had
begun to occur in England at the end of the seventeenth century from the accounts
of Francis Child, a major London goldsmith-banker (Quinn ). While the Dutch
innovation enabled Amsterdam merchants to obtain loans from a wider range of
sources at lower rates of interest almost immediately, the accounts of Francis Child
analyzed by Quinn indicate that lending rates to merchants in London actually rose
while pledging various forms of government debt as collateral for their borrowings
from Child. Quinn argues that the rise in interest rates was a response to increased
9 Coutts Archives, Ledger -. Account of John Law and Lord Ilay.
10 FromDer Groote Tafereel der Dwaasheid (Amsterdam, ), English translation kindly provided by Rik
Frehen.
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postwar demand for loanable funds by the private sector, which was taking advantage
of peacetime opportunities for investment in the period -. Child’s loans
guaranteed by government securities became larger, much more numerous, and for
longer periods compared to his practice before the accession of William III (Quinn
, pp.  and ). In terms of using Dutch techniques in the capital market
in London, Anne Murphy () has demonstrated that at least one broker,
Charles Blunt, in London had created an active business in options during the
stock market boom of the s.
The South Sea Bubble, however, disrupted this business for a few years (Charles
Blunt became bankrupt and committed suicide!). Despite the efforts of the South
Sea Company to sustain the level of their overpriced stock with the Bubble Act of
June , the bubble collapsed and the South Sea Company was restructured under
government supervision. Robert Walpole’s government managed, with the self-inter-
ested help of the Bank of England, to restore the vitality of the London stock market by
converting one-half of the South Sea stock into perpetual annuities offering  percent
interest for five years, to be reduced then to  percent and eventually to  percent. Thus,
Walpole at a stroke created an enormous stock of homogeneous, readily transferable,
and fungible financial assets that were widely held by at least , individuals
(Carlos, Neal and Wandschneider ). While the remaining stock of the South
Sea Company was gradually wound up due to the resistance of the Spanish empire
against allowing it to expand upon its monopoly of the slave trade, both the Bank of
England and the East India Company periodically increased their capital stock.
Meanwhile, the attention of actionistes in Amsterdam turned as well to the English
securities, which now represented the largest mass of tradable securities available to
European investors. The mini-bubbles that were initiated throughout the Netherlands
in late  failed to amount to much, creating only a brief spurt in the price of West
India Company shares and one marine insurance company in Rotterdam (Frehen,
Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst ; Gelderblom and Jonker a).
The Bank of England then quickly outstripped the Bank of Amsterdam as a focal
point for the international payments system of Europe with its success in withstanding
the shock of the collapse of the South Sea scheme in the autumn of . Even before
the expenses of the War of the Spanish Succession had exhausted the fiscal capacity
of the Province of Holland to pay most of the cost of Dutch wars as it had in the
last half of the seventeenth century, the Bank of Amsterdam hadmade its deposits irre-
deemable in . Thereafter, deposits could only be cashed out by transferring them
to another depositor willing to acquire them for their usefulness in settling accounts
with other bank customers. Nevertheless, this enabled them to retain full value for
settlement of debts denominated in bank money in the first place, thus protecting
creditors in Amsterdam from the possibilities of debasement or paper inflation.
This was an advantage for Dutch creditors, and international merchants dealing
through the port facilities of Amsterdam, but the growth of the Bank of
Amsterdam’s deposits in the future was limited by the expansion of trade and
capital flows directed through Amsterdam. The growth of London measured in
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terms of both trade and capital continued to outstrip that of Amsterdam. Throughout
the rest of the eighteenth century, while the population of Amsterdam stagnated,
barely rising from , in  to , in , that of London continued
to rise: from , in  to , in  (de Vries , p. 
(Amsterdam), p.  (London)).
The work of Isaac de Pinto () argued for the symbiosis of the two mercantile
powers in the field of government finance, especially in sustaining the remarkable rise
of British national debt over the course of the century. The business of actionistes, first
described in cynical detail by Josef de la Vega (), gradually evolved from an active
trade in shares of the VOC to a much more active trade in the  Percent Consols
created by the British government in . The root of this generally maligned
and much misunderstood trade was twofold: first, the very size of the capital stock
available in the secondary market and the large number of shareholders with manifold
motives for holding shares created a large customer base for the services of the stock
dealers; second, both Dutch and English joint-stock shares could be pledged as col-
lateral for loans of varying length.11 Creditors accepting shares as collateral for their
loans in case of future default naturally sought to protect their position by buying a
put for future delivery of the shares at a price sufficient to maintain their value as col-
lateral for the loan. Selling put options and offsetting the consequent risk by buying
call options became the specialized business of stockjobbers.
The business of dealing in options on securities was well understood and actively
practiced in both Amsterdam and London by the end of the seventeenth century.
De la Vega described it in his Confusion de Confusiones in terms of creating artificially
smaller divisions of the shares of the VOC, termed ducatons, and de Pinto elaborated
on the various strategies that options provided to the stock dealers in Amsterdam. He
noted that a purchaser of £,  Percent Consols for forward delivery in
Amsterdam at the next rescounter (settling) date had four possibilities when the contract
came due.
First, he could pay then the agreed sum of money and have the full amount inscribed in his
name in the books maintained by the Bank of England.
Second, if he anticipated a rise in the price, he could pay an actioniste a modest sum to prolong
the settlement of the contract another three or more months.
Third, he could sell the contract to another individual and pocket the difference in price if the
price of the Consol had risen in the meantime.
Fourth, he could pledge the £ Consol he had committed to purchase as collateral for a
loan of cash to be used for another venture. (de Pinto , p. )
11 Recent work elaborates on the practice of pledging securities as collateral for short-term commercial
loans in both Amsterdam and London, using records of private merchants (Gelderblom and Jonker
), brokers (Murphy ) and bankers (Quinn ).
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Pledging a security not yet paid for as collateral for a loan was something that de Pinto
lamented could not be donewith French rentes. He considered this legal restriction on
French government securities to be a fatal flaw for French finances. As discussed
below, it became illegal as well for British subjects, but they could take advantage
of the Amsterdam facilities to avoid the costs of this restriction for them. And the
British government could avoid as well the loss of finance implied by restrictions
on derivative contracts in Britain.
De Pinto argued that Dutch stock jobbing in the British annuities (mainly 
Percent Consols) became essential and necessary for the British government
because it borrowed increasingly large sums to wage each successive war in the eight-
eenth century. After borrowing million in sterling to finance theWar of the Austrian
Succession, the British government borrowed at first , then  and finally  million
pounds sterling as the expenses of the Seven Years War mounted (-). The
activity of stockjobbers, or actionistes in Amsterdam, he was convinced, enabled
Britain to float these enormous sums at reasonable prices (see Figure , Consols),
while the huge quantity of tradable securities available to investors provided contin-
ued livelihood to the Amsterdam stock dealers. De Pinto, according to Wilson, was
on the payroll of the English East India Company (Wilson , p. ), and the scion
of a family long associated with investments in English securities, so his testimony
carries the authority of a well-established and experienced participant in the financial
markets of both London and Amsterdam.
The most enduring, and ultimately most controversial, piece of legislation to arise
in the eighteenth century was Barnard’s Act (Geo. II, cap. ). The Act was intended
to eliminate time bargains in public securities altogether, the thought being that this
would remove sudden movements in the prices of the various forms of government
debt by eliminating the pernicious business of stockjobbing. Parliament passed the Act
originally in  for a period of three years to see what effect it might have, and then
made it permanent in  after it appeared that there had been few obviously adverse
consequences of the Act.
Sir George Caswall, the disgraced stockjobber and prime mover of the South Sea
scheme years earlier, tried to kill the bill by raising the specter that Navy victuallers
and suppliers would not be able to raise cash for supplying the Navy’s needs
without possessing the government’s promises to pay, which they needed to
pledge as collateral to their bankers (or ‘monied men’ as Caswall phrased it). In
reply, Barnard squelched Caswall’s argument by saying that the short-term forms of
government debt – Navy, Victualling and Exchequer bills – were not considered
to be ‘public securities’ and thereforewere not covered by the bill. His main argument
in favor of the bill, namely that stockjobbers were essentially con artists whose efforts
were a diversion from more useful pursuits, carried the day with the majority of the
House of Commons (Budgell -, pp. -).
The effect of Barnard’s Act, when the necessities of war finance arose a few years
later with theWar of the Austrian Succession, was twofold. On one account, it gave a
great deal of business to Dutch brokers, who only did business on time, and for
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quarterly accounts – February, May, August and November. Isaac de Pinto asserted
that Britain’s success in raising war finance for the War of the Spanish Succession,
the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War was due to the ability
of stockjobbers in London to sell their commitments to brokers in Amsterdam.
The separation of broker and jobber functions, according to de Pinto, put brokers
in London and jobbers in Amsterdam.
For subsequent historians (Wilson, Dickson), however, Barnard’s Act simply forced
the group of London jobbers, whether they had business connections in Amsterdam or
not, to deal only with each other in London, knowing that it was to neither party’s
advantage to report the other to the authorities. The reward for reporting a violation
of the Act to the authorities was only £ and had to be split with the government.
However the traders in London responded to Barnard’s Act and the temptation of large
new issues of prime government debt during the s, s and s, it is clear that
their connections with Amsterdamwere strengthened substantially. If Barnard’s Act had
little effect in practice on the London stockbrokers, then the rising interest of
Amsterdam stockbrokers in English securities came from the demand of their Dutch
customers for remunerative placements of their capital, not from displacement of
stock exchange business in derivatives to Amsterdam. But whenever the London stock-
brokers tried to organize more formally, the restrictions imposed by Barnard’s Act and
other statutory restraints on securities trading became binding (Neal ). The testi-
mony of de Pinto about the importance of Amsterdam’s well-developed derivatives
market with its experienced professionals for the initial placement of large blocks of
British government debt cannot be dismissed.
IV
A series of disruptions to the financial ties between London and Amsterdam ensued
shortly after de Pinto’s work was published in . Revolutions, first in North
America and then in France, strained the political ties between the United
Kingdom and the United Provinces and ultimately their financial ties as well. In
the continued historical debate over the timing and causes of the relative decline of
Amsterdam to London, it is clear that the expenses of the War of the Spanish
Succession (-) had finally removed the Netherlands from further active partici-
pation in the great power politics of Europe. Thereafter, despite the strategic interests
of Holland and Zeeland, which required open access to the high seas to maintain the
prosperity of their long-distance merchants, the Netherlands maintained neutrality in
the remaining wars of the eighteenth century. The long Anglo-Dutch connection
came to a bitter end, moreover, perhaps with the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War
(-) (Wilson ), certainly with the Batavian Republic created under French
revolutionary pressure in  (Neal ), and finally with the incorporation of
the kingdom of Holland into the French empire by Napoleon in  (Riley ).
The threat of war generally caused a temporary fall in all British ‘funds’ including
Bank of England stock in , and actual war created sharper and longer falls in
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government debt prices as in  (War of Austrian Succession) and again in 
(Seven Years War). When peace negotiations signaled the end of the war,
however, prices would rebound. The certainty of an initial fall in price of British secu-
rities and an ultimate rise upon a successful conclusion of the war created obvious
incentives for Dutch financiers to buy up British securities at the outset of a war
and then sell them off at the conclusion (see Figure .) At the end of the War of
Austrian Succession, as prices of the perpetual  percent annuities issued to finance
the British participation in the war rose closer to par, the government began a con-
version of its  percent annuities. The price of the  percent annuities went above
par as the  percent annuities approached par, as the current yields of the two versions
of British government debt had always converged. Both annuities were redeemable at
par by the government, but instead of simply issuing new  percent annuities at close
to par and using the proceeds to redeem the  percent annuities, the government
chose to offer life annuities as an extra ‘sweetener’ or douceur to the holders of the
 percent annuities. The life annuities were added to an equal book value of the
new  percent annuities that replaced the  percent annuities.
Various explanations were offered at the time for this procedure, which has recently
been re-examined by Christopher Chamley (). Chamley shows that the  percent
callable bonds were priced as derivatives of the  percent annuities that in 
replaced them, the first step in Pelham’s eventual consolidation of the accumulated
British debt into the  Percent Consols. Excessive pessimism about the rebound of
prices of the new  Percents allowed the government to reduce its borrowing cost
as bond prices recovered after the war much sooner than expected, according to
Figure . The British ‘funds’ –
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Chamley. Life annuities were offered to investors to compensate them for the incon-
venience of making the transfer from one security to another, but perhaps also to lock
in foreigners to the new securities as the life annuities were not as easily transferred as
the perpetual annuities, and hence much less liquid.
Isaac de Pinto had another explanation for the offer of life annuities, however,
which was based on the widespread use of British securities as collateral for private
loans. If the holder of the security had already pledged it as collateral for an outstand-
ing loan, repaying the private loan ahead of time imposed a cost on the debt-holder
that might be compensated by the additional income from the added life annuity. The
huge mass of  Percent annuities now available to Dutch investors (l’océan d’annuités
according to de Pinto) provided less interesting rates of return than the earlier forms of
British government debt. Higher returns were also potentially available if other
European governments could be induced to offer guarantees similar in nature to
those that had proved so successful for the British government since .
With the consolidation of British debt into the  Percent Consolidated Annuity in
, and the overall reduction in interest rates paid by the Pelham administration,
Dutch investors began looking for more attractive returns elsewhere, as analyzed by
Riley (, ch. ). Beginning with Austria, Dutch investors expanded their range
of foreign government loans to neighboring states – Denmark, Sweden and then
beyond to Russia, Poland, Spain, and then to France and especially the newly
created United States of America (Riley , chs.  and ). These were managed pri-
marily by individual merchant banks, each country’s loans becoming the primary
responsibility of a single house, whose reputation was the key to the marketability
of the country’s debt to Dutch investors. This initiated a process of merchant
banking that eventually became the model for the British success in foreign
lending, led by the House of Rothschild, in the nineteenth century.12
In addition to the disruption to Dutch financiers caused by Pelham’s conversion, a
series of financial crises began to occur in Amsterdam, each arising in fact from events
initiated in London. The crisis of , the result of the Jacobite incursion that year in
the midst of the general European War of the Austrian Succession, caused all the
British securities to dip sharply, reaching bottom at the end of March . The
recovery upon news of the Jacobite defeat and dispersal was equally abrupt, but
prices of the British funds never reached prewar levels even after concluding the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (see Figure ). The continued expansion of British debt
with each succeeding war of the eighteenth century necessarily weighed on the
market price of existing debt held by the Dutch.
12 A recent paper by Christiaan van Bochove (b) describes another technique used by a consortium
of merchant bankers in Amsterdam to guarantee service of loans to the kingdom of Denmark by
having first claim on the Sound tolls, foretelling a similar technique used by British merchant
banks in the nineteenth century, e.g. Anthony Gibbs & Sons managing the sale of Peru’s guano
exports in London to service Peruvian government bonds (Vizcarra ).
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The next crisis to affect Dutch investors was in , when the results of the Battle of
Plassey became known and the price of East India Company stock shot up spectacularly.
As some Dutch houses, notably the firm of Gebruder Neufville, had sold English East
India Company stock short on the expectation that the French forces would prevail, a
liquidity crisis unfolded. This affected a large number of firms throughout the
Netherlands, Britain and Germany, and led to serious consideration of establishing a
jointly funded insurance fund in Amsterdam to act as a lender of last resort. As it
became clear that the focus of the problemwas the single firm of Neufville, the proposal
was abandoned and the Dutch firms focused on working out their eventual claims on
Neufville, which eventually paid out  percent of its debts to the various creditors.
Having successfully quarantined the toxic assets created by the Neufville firm, the
remaining Dutch merchant bankers then resumed their profitable business in the
expanded trade throughout Europe that ensued (Wilson , ch. ).
The subsequent crisis in  was more serious, as it involved outright fraud by a
Scottish bank, which somehow had inveigled large accommodation loans from
Clifford & Sons, long one of the leading merchant banks in Amsterdam in their
role as agents for the English East India Company. The extent of Clifford & Sons
debts to the banking community of Amsterdam and London was so great that a
mutual lending bank, first proposed in , was actually established. The Stads-
Beleeningkamer served its purpose well, extending credit with municipal support to
established banking houses on the basis of commodities and domestic debt posted
as collateral. Again, however, the source of the systemic failure was quickly identified
to be the one firm, and its creditors in London actually came to its rescue while taking
over its subsequent business. Accordingly, the nascent lender of last resort in the form
of a mutual insurance fund was wound up in .
When the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War broke out in , however, Amsterdam
bankers were truly faced with a systemic crisis that was not focused on any particular
banking house. The Stads-Beleeningkamer was resurrected and left in place, albeit not
with enough funding to serve truly as a lender of last resort during the turmoil of the
following decades. The hostility of the British to Dutch investors for their continued
financial support of American colonial aspirations throughout the American
Revolutionary War did provoke the British attack on Amsterdam in . But
even earlier, when Lord North commissioned an inquiry into the extent of Dutch
holdings of the British national funds in , Dutch stockholders felt pressure to
either withdraw or conceal their holdings in the British funds thereafter (Wilson, p.
). Opinions vary on the extent to which this occurred. Wilson argued that the
Dutch had little alternative but to withdraw, but Carter noted little change in the
holdings of wealthy Dutch recorded in the Collateral Succession Tax records of
the city of Amsterdam. Carter noted that while prices of British funds fell with the
American and Dutch Wars, this made the yield on them, which rose to nearly 
percent, all the more attractive (Carter , p. ). While holdings of French
rentes by the wealthy Dutch increased in the s as well, that did not require
them to reduce their holdings of British securities.
ANN M. CARLOS AND LARRY NEAL
Figure  presents the situation that confronted Dutch investors in the British funds
from the consolidation of the  Percent annuities, the prices of which began to appear
in the Course of the Exchange in , until the end of , when the French occu-
pation of Amsterdam cut Dutch investors from their normal access to the London
market. The surprising volatility of the English East India Company stock was
clearly a matter of continuing concern for the Dutch investors, and not merely
those who had lost in their speculative ventures at the end of the Seven Years War.
The price movements in the stock of the Bank of England, while subdued compared
to those of the East India Company, also became more volatile after mid-century.
Even the new ‘blue-chip’ security available in unprecedented quantities for investors
throughout Europe, the  Percent Consol, became increasingly volatile over the
course of the last half of the eighteenth century, especially when Britain became
ensnared in the American Revolutionary War. Table  calculates the coefficients of
variation in the price of  Percent Consols over successive five-year intervals from
 to the summer of  in order to quantify the increased volatility in British
security prices that were an increasing concern for Dutch investors. Further, the
gradual rise in price of the Consols after the Treaty of Paris in  simply meant
that new investors were receiving lower yields as the price approached par again.
Riley, like Carter, attributes Dutch investment in foreign government securities,
whenever and wherever it occurred, to their continued search for reasonable
returns on their surplus capital. Even after the establishment of the Batavian
Republic under the watchful eyes of French armies in , and the fleeing of the
wealthiest merchant bankers such as Henry Hope to join his correspondents in
London, fresh Dutch investment in government securities continued. Only now it
was domestic Dutch government debt that was finally centralized into a combined
national debt, replacing the scattering of annuities and bearer bonds previously
issued by the cities and provinces. The debt was used to pay off the liberation
Figure . British funds, –
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forces of the French in the first instance, but thanks to the tax reforms of the Patriots
the debt service was kept up faithfully. Later, under Napoleon’s sterner rule, the
Dutch found themselves providing funds to the various satellite kingdoms under
French rule, so they in turn could pay tribute to the French empire.
Indeed, had Napoleon fully understood the possibilities of Dutch finance, with its
cosmopolitan connections through family-run firms dispersed throughout Europe
and the Atlantic economy, he might have been able to utilize it more effectively
for financing his occupation armies. Gabriel Ouvrard, in fact, managed to get
Napoleon’s permission to carry out a daring scheme to supply his Spanish forces
with silver piastres minted in Mexico. His plan required using the remaining facilities
of Hope & Company in Amsterdam, with whom he retained good connections, to
use their well-established relations with Barings & Company in London to bring the
Mexican coins from Vera Cruz to Portsmouth (using the British warshipDiana), then
to Antwerp (presumably on fishing smacks), and to Paris using Ouvrard’s connec-
tions. It proved successful in providing much-needed payment to Napoleon’s
troops in Spain, but the share taken by Barings proved equally successful in
payment to Wellington’s Peninsular Army. Ouvrard’s commissions so infuriated
Napoleon that he put the talented financier in prison in , and proceeded to
implement his ill-fated Continental Blockade. That effort succeeded in disrupting
the trade flows that had provided the basis for transferring capital loans and repayments
through the financial center of Amsterdam. It also succeeded in fully displacing the
center of international capital from Amsterdam to London.13
Meanwhile, the attraction of London as a destination for flight capital from the
nobles and merchants in Europe who were subjected to the expropriations of
Napoleon’s forces brought fresh capital and talent into service for the British military
and naval effort (Neal , ch. ; ). Rather than put Ouvrard’s counterpart in
London, Nathan Rothschild, in prison, the British government took advantage of
Table . Volatility measures of British Consols (five-year averages), –
From To StdDev Mean CoeffVar
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
 Aug   Aug  . . .
13 This section is drawn from Neal (, ch. ).
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his network of agents on the Continent to continue smuggling specie, much counter-
feit, for the financing of Wellington’s troops in Europe (Kaplan ). Indeed, the
House of Rothschild took advantage of its position in the London capital market
to become the leadingmerchant banking house of Europe after  (Ferguson ).
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